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Broadband over cable television networks has become a growing force on the retail
market in the EU. Thus, a debate has always been raised whether cable television
networks should also be subject to open internet access obligations as PSTN and fibre.
This article aims to share its view from a legal perspective. In order to do so, it conducts a
survey of the current regulatory measures on broadband over cable television networks
within the 27 EU Member States, and then carries out an in-depth legal analysis on
Member States that attempted to regulate broadband over cable television networks. The
conclusion is that broadband over cable television networks is currently deregulated, and
will probably remain so in the future.
& 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Due to the technological convergence emerging at the end of the last century, broadband services have been able to be
delivered over many platforms, prominently PSTN, cable television (CATV) and fibre (Spulber & Yoo, 2008). In order to
promote competition on the broadband market, regulators in general have two options: inter-platform and intra-platform
competitions (Picot & Wernick, 2007). The former enhances competition between different technologies while the latter
promotes competition using the same network technology. The intra-platform competition is featured by open-access
obligations on the incumbents to open their infrastructures and associated facilities to new comers. These obligations in
general contain two types: on the one hand, physical access, including local loop unbundling (LLU) and subloop unbundling,
and on the other hand, logical or bitstream access.
The vast majority of countries, including the European Union (EU), have already imposed open internet access
obligations on PSTN and/or fibre networks (OECD, 2005). The question nevertheless remains whether CATV networks
should also be done the same. From a technical perspective, access to CATV networks by third parties can to some extent be
opened, though probably not as efficiently as PSTN or fibre networks. However, the question whether CATV operators can be
obliged to provide open internet access is not only technical but also legal. The debate on the legal feasibility of imposing
those obligations upon CATV operators arises basically at the same time when broadband began to be offered via CATV
networks. Two opposite practices can be observed: some countries introduced open internet access to CATV, e.g. Canada
(Van Gorp & Middleton, 2010) and South Korea (Wu, 2004); and others preferred to leave CATV networks unregulated. In
the EU, alongside with the rapid development of broadband over PSTN or fibre since 1990s, broadband over CATV has alsoAll rights reserved.
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offerings including DSL (digital subscriber line), fibre, mobile, satellite and so on (EC, 2010a). In view of the increasing
importance of broadband over CATV, the EU also experiences the discussion whether CATV networks should also be subject
to ex-ante regulation, in particular open internet access obligations, in the same way as PSTN or fibre.
This article aims to answer this question from a legal perspective based on an empirical approach by examining the
regulatory environment within the EU by April 2013. The second part of this article offers a descriptive introduction to the
special features of the EU legal context of broadband regulation in order to lay the background for the following analyses.
Part 3 offers an overview of the competition situation of broadband over CATV at the retail level. Afterwards, the subsequent
two parts surveys the imposition or not of open internet access to CATV networks, respectively on the market for wholesale
network infrastructure access (Part 4) and the market for wholesale broadband access (Part 5) within the 27 EU Member
States. There, particular focus is placed on some Member States attempting to regulate CATV networks, and an in-depth
thinking is also provided on the underlying reasons. After such a study, the last part concludes that CATV networks are still
immune to the EU regulatory framework and will probably remain so in the future.2. Legal context
Broadband regulation falls into the scope of the EU telecommunications regulation which must be respected by Member
States. In order to examine how broadband over CATV is regulated at national level, it is necessary to have some basic legal
knowledge about the EU telecommunications regulatory framework. The following paragraphs first provide a brief
introduction to the principles and methodologies that are used to impose open access obligations, and then assess in
general how the regulation of CATV can fit into this mechanism.
The current EU telecommunications regulatory framework was pushed forward by technological convergence starting in
1990s. Technological convergence made it difficult to regulate the telecommunications sector based on platforms or
technologies. In order to adapt to this phenomenon the EU adopted a technologically neutral approach for telecommunica-
tions regulation in 2002 and had it amended in 2009. This approach is the so-called significant-market-power (SMP)
regime, of which the core elements are incorporated in the articles 14–16 of the Framework Directive (EU, 2009a).
According to this regime, EU Member States, in order to regulate a telecommunications undertaking, must conduct an
analysis on three cumulative conditions: (i) to define a relevant market, (ii) to assess whether there is an undertaking
individually, or collectively with others, having SMP, and (iii) to impose regulatory obligations only upon the undertaking(s)
with SMP. This is the so-called three-step analysis. Only telecommunications undertakings whose products are included into
defined relevant markets are then analysed by NRAs to see whether they may be designated to have SMP; moreover, only
undertakings designated to have SMP can be subject to regulatory obligations. It is one of the regulatory obligations
imposed upon SMP undertaking to open their networks to third parties. Undertakings whose products are excluded from
the delineation of a relevant market and those whose products are included in a relevant market and that are nevertheless
not found to have SMP should otherwise not be regulated.
Consequently, the question whether a CATV network should be obliged to open to third parties can be boiled down to
two sub-questions: (i) whether a CATV network can be included in a recommended relevant market; and if so, then (ii)
whether this CATV operator has SMP on that relevant market. The first question is more important than the second one as
an exclusion from market definition is nothing more than a clearance that operators providing the excluded telecommu-
nications services are not candidates of SMP operators (the second step) and hence will be not regulated (the third step).
This explains why CATV operators focused so much on market definition when arguing that they should not be regulated
(Cable Europe, 2006).
In order to enhance harmonisation, the EU does not leave the definition of relevant markets to the sole discretion of
Member States. The Commission is required to publish a recommendation on relevant markets that are susceptible to
ex-ante regulation (the Recommendation) (EC, 2007a). The Recommendation in general summarises the practices under
competition law in market definition. Accordingly, telecommunications markets should be defined based on demand-side
and supply-side substitution. This is usually performed through a hypothetical monopoly test to examine the reaction of
consumers to a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP). This test also implies that market
definition and market power assessment are to some extent intertwined (Schwarz, 2007). More specifically, the answer to
the hypothetical monopolist test amounts to the answer to the market power assessment itself: if the hypothetical
monopolist can profitably raise a SSNIP, it is a monopolist. Due to this feature, national regulatory authorities (NRAs)
sometimes mix market definition with market power assessment. This has a profound impact on the practice of market
definition, which will be elaborated further in the following parts.
In addition to the synthesis of competition-law practices, the Recommendation also entails some sector-specific
elements. One of the most important is that it defines wholesale markets based on the demand derived from the related
retail markets. Regarding the provision of broadband, the Recommendation, in order to allow alternative operators without
own infrastructures to provide retail broadband services, defines two wholesale products: physical network access (i.e. local
loop unbundling and sub-loop unbundling), and non-physical or virtual network access (including bitstream access). The
former is referred to as wholesale network infrastructure access (Market 4), while the latter as wholesale broadband access
(Market 5) (EC, 2007a).Please cite this article as: Hou, L., et al. Can open internet access be imposed upon European CATV networks?
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imposed only on Market 4 and Market 5.1 Consequently, if a regulator wants to impose access obligations on CATV
networks, it has to first examine whether CATV should be considered part of Market 4 and/or Market 5. However, two
problems come out in relation to the analysis of such a market definition. First, CATV usually does not pose direct
constraints on PSTN at the wholesale level. This lack of direct constraints is often due to the fact of high switching costs that
DSL-based wholesale customers have to bear when migrating to CATV-based products, and vice versa. Therefore, it is likely
that neither of them will switch to CATV operators in case of a SSNIP. Secondly, CATV may exercise indirect constraints from
retail markets. This will be the case if PSTN operators initiate a SSNIP on the wholesale markets, a large number of
broadband end-users switch to retail broadband over CATV so as to make the wholesale price increase unprofitable. In this
case, PSTN wholesale operators cannot behave independently of CATV operators even though the latter exert no direct
constraints. However, the Recommendation asserts that “indirect pricing constraint, where it is found to exist, should be
taken into account when assessing if the incumbent DSL operator has SMP on the relevant market” (EC, 2007b, p. 35), hence,
not in the stage of defining the relevant market.2 This statement seems to imply that CATV networks are not supposed to be
subject to ex-ante regulation as they are not included in Market 4 and Market 5. This view nevertheless has not been able to
reach consensus among all the Member States. As discussed in the following, the treatment of indirect constraints underlies
the tension between the Commission and some Member States regarding regulating broadband over CATV.
3. CATV in the retail broadband market
Open internet obligation falls into the so-called wholesale regulations, the purpose of which is to promote competition at
the retail level. Therefore, when imposing such an obligation, Member States must first take a look at the retail market. This
article follows the same logic by examining retail broadband over CATV first.
From a legal perspective, the investigation of retail markets has two purposes. First, wholesale markets (where open
internet obligation is imposed) are defined based on the demand- and supply-side substitution derived from the retail level.
Therefore, it is always the first step for Member States to delineate the boundaries of retail markets within the SMP regime,
and then to go upwards to investigate the related wholesale markets. Secondly, as indicated in Part 2, the analysis of indirect
constraints is the key in deciding whether CATV can be subject to open internet access obligation. Inderst and Valletti
(2007a) indicate that indirect constraints are particularly effective if the retail market is highly competitive, and they
become more important than direct constraints if the upstream market is relatively less competitive compared to the retail
market. This is exactly the situation in broadband markets in the EU where the retail markets are more or less competitive
while the wholesale markets are not. Moreover, although retail market shares should not be a decisive factor, it is
informative on the effectiveness of indirect constraints. Therefore, Table 1 is drawn to display the market shares of
broadband based on different technologies on the retail market in all the 27 Member States.
The first observation from Table 1 is that CATV broadband operators in most EU Member States have not been able to
make a significant presence on the retail market. On the EU scale their influence is in general considerably less than PSTN
operators. This can be in particular seen in Greece and Italy where there is no broadband via CATV at all. This also implies
that CATV operators should in general not be regulated on the wholesale markets as they hardly enjoy SMP. Against this
general situation, it is also observed that in some Member States broadband over CATV has been able to gain large market
shares on the retail broadband market. Those Member States comprise Malta, Hungary, Belgium, Portugal and the
Netherlands where CATV operators account for over or close to 40% market shares. Despite such a substantial presence in
those Member States, attention should be paid to a fact that in most EU countries CATV networks are on the one hand
scattered in terms of geographic coverage and on the other hand are usually owned by a large number of operators (Cable
Europe, 2010). In comparison, PSTN networks are always ubiquitous and highly concentrated. This fact in general hinders
individual CATV operators from overwhelming PSTN operators, and hence becoming SMP operators. However, the large
amount of market shares of CATV operators taking as a whole may possibly challenge the market position of their PSTN
counterparts through indirect constraints. In other words, those PSTN incumbents may be then found to have no market
power due to the strong presence of CATV operators. Based on such a thought, the next two parts survey how the retail
competition has been reflected at the wholesale level.
4. CATV regulation in Market 4
As discussed in Part 1, open internet access obligations are of two types: physical access and bitstream access. According
to the EU regulation, physical access can only be imposed on Market 4. It is thus surveyed in the following whether Member
States have already imposed physical access obligations on CATV operators, and if so why.
Market 4 is defined by the EU to comprise physical access products to local loops. In order to impose an obligation of
local loop unbundling, NRAs must include CATV networks into Market 4 based on the demand-side and supply-side1 The Recommendation (EC, 2007a) provides Member States with a possibility to define relevant markets beyond what it recommends. In other words,
an open-Internet-access obligation may also be imposed on markets other than Market 4 and/or 5. However, the standard of proof to define newmarkets is
very high. As a result, Member States usually follow the Commission's recommended markets.
2 Nevertheless, it still remains a debate in economics how to deal with indirect constraints (Inderst & Valletti, 2007b).
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Table 1
Country report on the market shares of retail broadband based on different technologies (as of January 2010).
Source: adapted from EC (2010a).
MS DSL (%) Cable (%) Other technologies (%)
AT 68 30 2
BE 57 42 1
BG 31 13 56
CY 94 6 0
CZ 39 22 39
DE 90 9 1
DK 60 27 13
EE 42 21 37
EL 100 0 0
ES 80 19 1
FI 76 14 10
FR 95 5 0
HU 44 45 11
IE 72 10 18
IT 97 0 4
LV 49 8 43
LT 36 9 55
LU 83 16 1
MT 48 49 3
NL 62 36 2
PL 56 27 17
PT 59 38 3
RO 28 17 55
SE 59 20 21
SI 62 22 16
SK 46 10 44
UK 79 21 0
L. Hou et al. / Telecommunications Policy ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]]4substitution (i.e. direct constraints). The Recommendation maintains that “the unbundling of cable networks at this stage
does not appear technologically possible, or economically viable, so that an equivalent service to local loop unbundling
cannot be provided over cable networks” (EC, 2007b, p. 31). This has been confirmed by the European Regulators Group
(ERG, currently the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications, or BEREC). The ERG (2005) suggests a
technical possibility that an alternative operator may co-locate equipment of cable modem termination system at cable
operators' headend and interface to the Hybrid Fibre-Coaxial network, which has the same effect of local loop unbundling.
However, even the ERG acknowledges that this could only work with a small number of third parties due to spectrum
limitation. Since CATV networks cannot be unbundled at the same degree as PSTN, they cannot exert sufficient direct
constraints on PSTN networks. Furthermore, the Recommendation makes it clear that even if CATV can impose indirect
constraints from the retail level, those constraints should not be taken into account at the stage of market definition, but in
the phase of SMP assessment. Consequently, the conclusion of the Recommendation is that broadband over CATV should not
be included into Market 4, provided the unbundling of CATV networks remains technically or economically unviable.
Table 2 contains the information about the latest notifications of every EU Member State with regard to Market 4. This
table clearly shows that almost all Member States followed the approach within the Recommendation and excluded CATV
from Market 4. However, it is also observed that there are two maverick Member States, Portugal and the UK, which
deviated from this approach and included CATV on Market 4. In the following, this article attempts to answer two questions
concerning the two notifications: (i) how they reached such a conclusion and (ii) why the Commission approved their
proposals.
Neither ANACOM (the Portuguese regulator) nor Ofcom (the UK regulator) submitted that CATV could exert direct
constraints on PSTN. Their analyses of including broadband over CATV in Market 4 focused on indirect constraints. Both of
them alleged that the price of wholesale input occupied a significant part of the retail price, i.e. 50% in the Portuguese
notification and 65–75% in the UK notification (EC, 2010c). Thus, in case of 10% price increase at the wholesale level there
should be more than 5% price increase at the retail level. As a consequence, end users would switch to CATV-based
broadband to an extent that would make the wholesale price increase unprofitable. CATV was accordingly considered on the
same relevant market as PSTN.
However, the Commission disagreed with this analysis in both of the notifications. In particular, it held that it would not
be possible for the price increase to entirely pass on to the end users of retail broadband access products. This was due to the
fact that an LLU price increase could also affect other retail products, such as voice telephony and IPTV. Moreover, it was also
doubtful that competitors would not be able to partly absorb a 10% price increase in their margins. Nevertheless, the
Commission did not disapprove the two notifications. The main reason was that both ANACOM and Ofcom still proposed to
designate the PSTN incumbents as SMP operators. Hence, the Commission accepted the two notification as an exclusion of
cable from the definition of Market 4 would not lead to a different conclusion. This corresponds to the generally recognisedPlease cite this article as: Hou, L., et al. Can open internet access be imposed upon European CATV networks?
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Table 2
Country report for Market 4.
Source: adapted from EC (2013).
MS Date of
notifications
Is CATV
included?
Other
technologies
Direct
constraints
Indirect
constraints
Wholesale CATA
offer
SMP operators Access remedies
AT 17.06.2010 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
BE 20.05.2011 No No No No No PSTN PSTN
BG 27.01.2011 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
CY 14.12.2012 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
CZ 03.05.2010 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
DE 20.09.2010 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
DK 09.07.2012 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
EE 30.07.2009 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
EL 01.07.2011 No No No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
ES 13.11.2008 No No No No No PSTN PSTN
FI 18.10.2012 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
FR 26.05.2011 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
HU 01.04.2011 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
IE 17.12.2012 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
IT 27.06.2011 No Fibre+wireless No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
LT 06.05.2011 No Fibre+twisted
pair
No No No PSTN+fibre
+twisted pair
PSTN+fibre
+twisted pair
LU 27.10.2006 No No No No No PSTN PSTN
LV 12.11.2009 No Fibre No No No PSTN PSTN
MT 15.11.2012 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
NL 21.12.2012 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
PL 29.10.2010 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
PT 05.01.2009 Yes Fibre No Yes No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
RO 06.08.2010 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
SE 19.04.2010 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
SI 22.12.2010 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
SK 19.04.2012 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
UK 01.06.2010 Yes Fibre No Yes No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
L. Hou et al. / Telecommunications Policy ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]] 5importance of market definition that it is not an end in itself, but a tool to identify market power (Jones & Sufrin, 2011), and
also echoes the argument made earlier in this article that market definition is not an individual analysis, but intertwine with
the subsequent analysis of market power. Since the deviation did not affect the designation of SMP operators, the
Commission found no need to disapprove those two NRAs' proposals. However, it should be noted that if NRAs include cable
into the delineation of Market 4 and in the end find that some cable operator actually has SMP and should be regulated, the
Commission may veto their proposals according to Article 7 of the Framework Directive.
5. CATV regulation in Market 5
The second type of open internet access (i.e. logical or bitstream access) is affiliated to Market 5. In the following, this
part is dedicated to examining the views of the Commission and Member States on imposing bitstream access on CATV
operators. It is observed that while most Member States sided with the Commission some ones began to challenge the latter.
In view of such a conflict, a country-by-country study is carried out in order to identify the underlying reasons for such a
conflict.
Market 5 is defined as including bitstream access that permits the transmission of broadband data in both directions, as
well as other wholesale access provided over other infrastructures, if and when they offer facilities equivalent to bitstream
access. Since broadband over CATV can permit the transmission of broadband data in both directions, it is potentially part of
Market 5 from a technical standpoint. The ERG (2005) also recognised the technical possibilities to provide wholesale
broadband access over CATV through Layer 2 solutions and Layer 3 solutions. In addition, this article also notices that
wholesale broadband access over CATV is currently commercialised in five Member States, i.e. Austria, France, Hungary,
Malta and the Netherlands.
Despite such technical and commercial possibilities and realities, the Commission seems not to support the idea of
including CATV into Market 5. It maintains that the migration from DSL-based access to CATV-based access would give rise
to substantial switching costs so that switching is unlikely to occur in reaction to a SSNIP. Furthermore, since the
geographical coverage of CATV networks is in general limited, alternative operators need to negotiate with multiple CATV
operators in order to offer national-wide broadband provision. Therefore, the Commission expresses concerns on the
likeliness that CATV can impose direct competition against PSTN (EC, 2008a). Moreover, as regards the indirect constraints
that CATV operators may exercise on the providers of DSL-based wholesale broadband access, the Commission, in
accordance with the Recommendation, underlines that “such indirect pricing constraint, where it is found to exist, should be
taken into account when assessing if the incumbent DSL operator has SMP on the relevant market” (EC, 2007b, p. 35). It hasPlease cite this article as: Hou, L., et al. Can open internet access be imposed upon European CATV networks?
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Table 3
Countries excluding CATV from Market 5.
Source: adapted from EC (2013).
MS Date of
notifications
Is CATV
included?
Other
technologies
Direct
constraints
Indirect
constraints
Wholesale CATV
offer
SMP
operators
Access
remedies
BE 20.05.2011 No No No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
BG 27.01.2011 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
CY 14.12.2012 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
CZ 10.08.2012 Yes (veto) Fibre No Yes No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
EL 01.07.2011 No No No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
ES 26.12.2008 No No No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
FR 26.05.2011 No Fibre No No Yes PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
IE 17.12.2012 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
IT 14.04.2009 No Fibre+wireless No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
LT 31.10.2012 No No No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
LU 30.10.2006 No No No No No PSTN PSTN
PL 08.02.2013 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
RO 06.08.2010 No Fibre No No No Competitive No
SE 19.04.2010 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
SI 22.12.2010 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
SK 23.07.2012 No Fibre No No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
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networks fromMarket 5. The direct consequence was CATV operators are not considered undertakings able to have SMP and
thus should be subject to no regulation.
However, the Commission does not close the door completely. While pointing out that CATV operators in principle
cannot exert direct constraints on PSTN operators, the Commission does suggest that it may be not always the case. For such
a purpose, it provides some guidance for Member States to evaluate whether CATV can be considered as part of Market 5.
The Commission states that when a Member State considers that CATV operators can exert direct constraints, it should give
due consideration to the technical, practical and economic feasibility for CATV operators to offer facilities equivalent to
bitstream access (EC, 2009). As pointed out in the previous paragraph, there is no absolute technical infeasibility to realise
wholesale broadband access over CATV networks. The Commission's focus was accordingly on the practical and economic
feasibility. More specifically, it expects Member States to provide evidence on the capacity of CATV wholesale broadband
access to offer comparable critical product characteristics as those provided by DSL, notably in terms of service
management. Furthermore, Member States should also assess whether product differences may render it difficult for an
ISP to switch from DSL to a CATV wholesale broadband offer, independent of the possible technical substitutability. This can
be done, for example, by providing evidence that incentives for a wholesale migration are not significantly limited by
necessary modem replacements and reconfigurations (EC, 2010d). In addition, when a Member State intends to rely on the
effect of indirect substitution through a SSNIP test, the Commission demands a hypothetical monopolist test. In particular,
Member States must demonstrate that(i)Ple
Te“Internet service providers would be forced to pass a hypothetical wholesale price increase on to their consumers at the
retail level based on the wholesale/retail price ratio without being able to absorb it;(ii) there would be sufficient demand substitution at the retail level to retail services based on indirect constraints such as
to render the wholesale price increase unprofitable; and(iii) the customers of the ISPs would not switch to a significant extent to the retail arm of the integrated hypothetical
monopolist, in particular if the latter does not raise its own retail prices” (EC, 2008a, p. 7).Nevertheless, the standard of proof set up by the Commission is quite high. As a matter of fact, there are in total twelve
Member States that decided to deviate from the Recommendation and included CATV in Market 5. Those Member States
comprises Austria, Czech, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, and the UK.
The high burden of proof can be observed from the fact that none of those Member States actually convinced the
Commission of their conclusions. It is expected that the Commission vetoed the proposal of the Czech NRA as it cannot
prove both direct constraints and indirect constraints between CATV and DSL (EC, 2012). However, it is of surprise that the
Commission approved all the other proposals. In view of such a contradiction, the subsequent paragraphs attempts to
discover the underlying reasons in those eleven notifications.
In order to do so, this article examines first whether the inclusion of CATV into Market 5 would have changed the final
regulatory outcome, i.e. either the designation of SMP operators or the imposition of regulatory remedies. As discussed in
the previous part, the inclusion of CATV networks into Market 4 by Portugal and the UK did not affect the assessment of SMP
at all, and hence the Commission, though disagreeing with their analyses, still approved the two's proposals. If it is still the
case here, an easy conclusion can then be drawn that CATV networks so far still cannot exert direct constraints on PSTN
networks and thus should be not regulated.ase cite this article as: Hou, L., et al. Can open internet access be imposed upon European CATV networks?
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question raised in the above, it is found that in seven Member States the inclusion or exclusion of CATV network did not
affect the final regulatory outcome while for the other four Member States it actually could. Based on such a finding, those
eleven Member States deviating from the Commission's recommendation are divided into two groups. The first group
includes seven Member States, i.e. Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, and the Netherlands, as shown in
Table 4. The second group comprises four Member States, namely Denmark, Malta, Portugal and the UK, as in Table 5.
Within the first group of countries where CATV network were proposed to be included into the definition of Market 5, all
those countries found that the presence of broadband over CATV in those countries was nevertheless unable to sufficiently
restrain the market power of PSTN incumbents. Therefore, when assessing who has SMP after the market definition stage,
all those countries made the same conclusion that it was still those PSTN incumbents that should be designated as SMP
operators, thus being subject to regulatory obligations. Furthermore, CATV's insubstantial market position suggests that an
exclusion from the definition of Market 5 is nothing more than letting PSTN incumbents controlling, if not monopolising,
Market 5. Hence in either case it is still PSTN incumbents that should be regulated in the end. As the regulatory outcome
remained the same, the Commission found no need to veto those NRAs' notifications. This is similar to its practice with
regard to the notifications of Portugal and the UK within the previous part of this article. Consequently, the Commission still
considered that CATV networks were not substitutes for PSTN networks for the purpose of wholesale broadband access.
Subsequently, the analysis moves to the more controversial second group of countries. Unlike the first group, the
exclusion of broadband over CATV networks could have led to different regulatory decisions in the second groups, by either
affecting the designation of SMP operators or the scope of regulatory remedies. In other words, if CATV networks, as the
Commission states, be excluded from Market 5, a different regulatory outcome would have been reached, such as CATV
operators that were regulated would have been deregulated, or PSTN incumbents that were deregulated would have been
regulated. Thus, two questions are raised for a further investigation: (i) how those countries established direct constraints
between CATV networks and PSTN networks; and (ii) if they did not, why the Commission did not veto their notifications.
Since the national circumstances varied in those four countries, the following examination will be carried out on a per-
country basis.
The unique feature in the Danish notification (EC, 2008b) is that it is the only case so far where a Member State has
proposed to impose open access obligations upon a CATV operator. Apparently, an exclusion of CATV from Market 5 would
mean that the CATV network should have not been regulated, thus making this case distinct from the first group of cases. In
Denmark, the broadband market presents a market structure that differs from other Member States in that the incumbent
owns both a PSTN network and a CATV network. Before the notification, the Danish incumbent was only subject to access
obligations on its PSTN network. However, a market failure was gradually observed as the incumbent began to slow down
the upgrade on its PSTN network, and instead made substantial investment on its CATV network that was unregulated. The
Danish regulator, NITA, was concerned that DSL-based alternative operators would be left behind by such a circumventing
strategy. This was the underlying reason for NITA to include CATV on Market 5. The Commission, while affirming that it wasTable 4
Countries including CATV in Market 5 (Group 1).
Source: adapted from EC (2013).
MS Date of
notifications
Is CATV
included?
Other
technologies
Direct
constraint
Indirect
constraint
Wholesale CATV
offer
SMP
operators
Access
remedies
AT 25.10.2010 Yes Fibre No Yes Yes PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
DE 06.09.2010 Yes Fibre Yes No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
EE 30.07.2009 Yes Fibre Yes No No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
FI 18.10.2012 Yes Fibre No Yes No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
HU 01.04.2011 Yes Fibre Yes Yes Yes PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
LV 08.03.2010 Yes Fibre+wireless No Yes No PSTN PSTN
NL 21.12.2012 Yes Fibre No Yes Yes PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
Table 5
Countries including CATV in Market 5 (Group 2).
Source: adapted from EC (2013).
MS Date of
notifications
Is CATV
included?
Other alternative
technologies
Direct
constraints
Indirect
constraints
Wholesale CATV
offer
SMP operators Access
remedies
DK 09.07.2012 Yes Fibre+wireless Yes No No PSTN+fibre
+CATV
PSTN+fibre
+CATV
MT 15.11.2012 Yes Fibre+wireless Yes No Yes Competitive No
PT 05.01.2009 Yes Fibre No Yes No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
UK 01.10.2010 Yes Fibre No Yes No PSTN+fibre PSTN+fibre
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justified to extend the remedies to cover also the incumbent's CATV network and to require it to comply with all reasonable
requests for access. In exceptional circumstances, the SMP regime also allows Member States to impose proportionate and
justified obligations in an area outside but closely related to the relevant market under review. Therefore, the question of
exact market boundaries could be left open. Consequently, it may be argued that the Commission in this case still
maintained that CATV networks could not exert direct constraints on PSTN networks. Its reason to acknowledge the
appropriateness of the notification is that the incumbent circumvented the regulation over PSTN based on its ownership on
the largest CATV network in Denmark.
In the Maltese notification (EC, 2008c) the direct consequence of including CATV was that no operators were designated
as having SMP, and the whole market was left unregulated. The exclusion of the CATV network would turn the PSTN
operator into a near monopoly. The special feature of the broadband market in Malta is that it has the best inter-platform
competition among all the EU Member States. There are three networks (PSTN, CATV and WiMax) all with fully national
coverage, which probably benefits from the fact that Malta is one of the most densely populated countries in the world. In
particular, as indicated in Table 1, the PSTN operator and the CATV operator have similar market shares at the retail level. In
the decision, the Commission disagreed with the Maltese NRA's conclusion that wholesale broadband access provided over
CATV and DSL could form part of the same market. However, it still approved this proposal. The Commission did not explain
in its decision why it allowed such a proposal. Nevertheless, a possible explanation may be that even if the CATV network
would be excluded from the phase of market definition, its market power must still be taken into account in the second
phase, i.e. assessing whether the PSTN incumbent could have SMP. Despite the fact that it will not be considered as
candidates of SMP operators, the CATV operator with a network covering the whole Malta may be considered as a
constraining force that makes the PSTN incumbent unable to act independently of its competitors, customers or ultimately
consumers, and thus no SMP (Hou, 2008). Since the outcome on SMP designation would possibly remain the same, the
Commission approved this notification. Consequently, the Commission here was still of the opinion that CATV networks
cannot be included into Market 5.
It is interesting to compare the Maltese notification with the Hungarian notification categorised in the first group (EC,
2011a). The broadband sectors of the two Member States are very similar. First, both of them have a relatively similar retail
market structure between PSTN and CATV. Secondly, broadband over CATV in both countries are the strongest in the EU,
with Malta sitting on the top and Hungary following. Last but not least, both Member States decided to include CATV in
Market 5 in their regulatory decisions. However, it turns out that Malta concluded that its Market 5 was competitive
whereas Hungary designated the three PSTN incumbents as SMP operators. Despite the similarities, there is indeed one
major difference between the two countries. In Malta, the CATV network, similar to the PSTN network, belongs to one
operator and has footprints all over the country. By contrast, both the CATV network coverage and ownership in Hungary
are “scattered or fragmented” (Bánhidi & Pápai, 2010, p. 13). They are disadvantaged to some extent by the ubiquitous
networks of their PSTN counterparts. Furthermore, alternative operators, when switching to CATV networks, would be
handicapped by the fact that they must reach access agreements with a large number of CATV operators. Therefore, those
CATV operators, though making a significant influence at the retail level, are not considered to constrain the PSTN
incumbent due to their small size individually. However, this article is of the opinion that if those CATV networks are not
considered to exert sufficient competition on the PSTN operators, they should not be considered as effective substitutes at
the stage of market definition. Consequently, the Hungarian NRA should have not included them into Market 5. However,
since the regulatory outcome would remain the same, the Commission in the end still approved the Hungarian notification.
If the overlap between market definition and SMP assessment is not unambiguous in other cases, it cannot be clearer
within the Portuguese notification (EC, 2008d) and the UK notification (EC, 2010c). Both Member States took CATV into
account when defining geographic relevant markets. More specifically, the two Member States separated CATV-strong
regions from others, and hence defined two sub-national geographic markets in their territories, i.e. regions with strong
presence of broadband over CATV and regions with weak or no presence of broadband over CATV. The inclusion of CATV
thus made a difference in that Market 5 would otherwise have been defined as a national market. Most importantly, the
taking into account of CATV networks resulted into the deregulation of the PSTN incumbent in CATV-strong regions. To
some extent, these two notifications bear similar results to the Maltese notification with the only difference that in the
former deregulation took place at sub-national level while in the latter deregulation was made on a national scale. However,
the definition of sub-national geographic markets can be considered as a preliminary analysis of SMP (Hou, 2010). Within
the two notifications, the Commission agreed with neither of the two NRAs' justifications for the inclusion of CATV.
However, since both Member States claimed that they took CATV into account only when its presence was capable of
exercising a sufficient competitive constraint, they accordingly already kept the assessment of market power into mind
when defining sub-national markets. Although such competitive constraints were not recognised by the Commission as a
sufficient justification to include CATV in Market 5, they should be definitely one of the factors to assess SMP. Furthermore,
even if an operator has been designated to have SMP on a national scale, geographical imbalance of market power may be
relied upon by NRAs to impose different remedies across regions (EC, 2008e). Thus, even if CATV networks had been
excluded from Market 5, it would still be possible that the two NRAs may impose different remedies in CATV-strong regions
and CATV-weak regions. Consequently, although the designation of the SMP operator may be different in term of the scope
of the geographic market (the exclusion of CATV could lead to a national market), the imposition of regulatory obligations
would probably remain the same. The Commission therefore accepted these notifications. Here again, the Commission didPlease cite this article as: Hou, L., et al. Can open internet access be imposed upon European CATV networks?
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was still of the view that CATV networks should not be included into the definition of Market 5.
In conclusion, it is found that although many Member State included CATV into Market 5 the Commission's opinion that
CATV should not be regulated still remains unaffected. In all the cases, the inclusion of CATV was only a result of carrying out
market power assessment at the stage of market definition. In view of the intertwined nature of the two analyses, those
Member States' practice was not really a deviation from the Recommendation. Moreover, the imposition of open access
obligation to CATV network in Denmark may be considered as an exceptional circumstance with no general implication.
6. Conclusions
The answer to the question whether CATV can be subject to open internet access is not only a technical one but also a
legal one. The EU telecommunications regulatory framework implements a technological neutral principle, and does not
provide a clear answer. The analyses in the above aim to shed some light on the answer from a legal perspective based on
the examination of the current regulatory environment in the EU 27 Member States.
From a legal perspective, the open-Internet-access obligation must be imposed according to the SMP regime.
Consequently, the answer to the question whether CATV operators can be obliged to open their networks is boiled down
to a question whether CATV networks can be included into Market 4 and/or Market 5 according to direct and indirect
substitution. The Commission is of the view that (i) broadband over CATV cannot exert direct constraints on PSTN networks
on these two wholesale markets; (ii) indirect constraints, even if existing, must be analysed under the stage of SMP
assessment, rather than market definition. Since in either cases CATV operators cannot be considered as candidates for SMP
operators, it seems fair to conclude that broadband over CATV should in principle not be regulated according to the EU
telecommunications regulatory framework.
However, the survey of national implementation suggests that some Member States deviated from the Commission's
approach and included CATV into Market 4 and Market 5; and the Commission nevertheless still approved their
notifications based on the finding that the exclusion of CATV networks would not result into different regulatory outcomes.
The Commission should not be blamed for its end-justifying-means practice. It has been pointed out at the beginning of this
article that the approach for market definition, i.e. the hypothetical monopoly test, makes market definition and market
power assessment to some extent mixed up. Therefore, those Member States did not commit an absolute error by already
taking into account indirect constraints at the stage of market definition. As long as the whole analysis is performed
appropriately, there is no doubt that the conclusions must maintain the same according to either approach.
Consequently, this article would like to make two observations based on its survey. First, the current EU telecommunica-
tions regulation suggests that CATV networks should in principle not be subject to ex-ante broadband access obligations.
Secondly, the presence of broadband over CATV is able to constrain the market power of PSTN incumbents, and thus can
potentially deregulate the latter.
However, the Commission also leaves open the question with regard to the exceptional circumstances where CATV
operators can be considered to effectively restrict the PSTN operators. It indeed provides several guidelines on how to reflect
direct and indirect constraints when evaluating the market power of broadband over CATV. However, the standard of proof
is raised so high that all the attempts from Member States have failed. This in practice makes it impossible for NRAs to have
CATV network subject to open access obligations. As discussed before, even in the Hungarian case where the CATV operator
has a similar weight as the PSTN operator on the retail broadband market, they are still not considered to pose effective
indirect constraints. Moreover, such high standard of proof may also account for the fact that Belgium, as a country with
strong presence of CATV-based broadband, never took CATV into account when reviewing Market 4 and Market 5.3 This
leads to an impression that the Commission has no intention to regulate CATV networks.
Such an intention of the Commission to deregulate broadband over CATV cannot be clearer when compared with its
practice related to broadband over fibre. The Commission, in many events, underlines that CATV networks cannot offer the
same level of wholesale broadband access as PSTN networks because most CATV networks are fragmented. While fibre3 In June 2011 the Belgian media regulators, after reviewing the market for retail broadcasting transmission, proposed to oblige the incumbent CATV
operators to provide alternative operators with a possibility to resell their broadband internet products. The very justification behind such a proposal was
that bundled offers, including broadband and TV, became more and more important in Belgium. It was thus necessary for alternative operators to be able to
offer broadband services in addition to TV services in order to compete with the CATV incumbents (EC, 2011b). However, the authors cast doubt on a
broader application of the Belgian practice for the subsequent four reasons. First, the open-Internet-access obligation proposed by the Belgian media
regulators concerned only resale, and cannot be compared with stricter access obligations imposed on Market 4 and 5, such as Layer 2 or 3 accesses. More
importantly, this means that the alternative operators will have no control over the broadband services that they will offer, not even to say having their
services differentiated from those of the incumbent operators. Secondly, there is still a debate on the appropriateness of extending access obligations from
broadband to TV, or vice versa, based on bundled products offered at the retail level (Stumpf, 2011). Thirdly, it is not a common feature in the EU to regulate
the retail broadcasting market. In almost all Member States this retail market has been deregulated. Last but not least, in the decision the Commission
pointed out that the Belgian authorities did not sufficiently justify the proportionality of the broadband internet resale obligation. It nevertheless took no
action because of its lack of competence in reviewing the remedies proposed by NRAs under the old EU consultation procedure. This situation has been
improved since 26th May, 2011 with the entering into effect the new EU consultation procedure. The new EU consultation procedure affords the
Commission with a say in NRAs' proposed remedies (Queck, De Streel, Hou, Jost, & Kosta, 2010). This article is of the opinion that the Commission will be
more active in monitoring the remedied proposed NRAs in the future, and consequently it will be less likely to see that insufficiently justified remedies,
such as those in the Belgian case, are approved by the Commission.
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this fact as a basis to deny the inclusion of fibre into Market 4 or Market 5. Furthermore, another concern of the Commission
to include CATV networks is that the switching costs are too high for DSL-based alternative operators to migrate to CATV-
based services. Therefore, CATV cannot exert direct constraints on PSTN networks. Nevertheless, it goes without any doubt
that a huge amount of switching costs is also needed for alternative operators to migrate to fibre-based broadband services.
The Commission nevertheless never questions the inclusion of fibre into Market 4 or Market 5, though many Member States
did not clarify the extent of such switching costs between PSTN and fibre in their notifications. In addition, in view of the
promising bandwidth provided over fibre, the relationship between fibre and PSTN may be comparable to that between
narrowband and broadband. With regard to the latter, the Commission has maintained that narrowband and broadband
should be on separate markets as the substitution between the two is only unidirectional, in other words consumers seldom
switch from broadband to narrowband (EC, 2003). This is also applicable to the substitution between PSTN and fibre since
not many fibre consumers are expected to switch back to PSTN. Again, the Commission never raises this question when
analysing whether fibre should be included into Market 4 and Market 5. Instead, what is commonly seen is that the
Commission constantly accused Member States of not including fibre into their regulation.
The Commission's deregulatory intention for broadband over CATV may reflect the concern that service-based intra-
platform competition may have a negative effect on broadband penetration. According to Bouckaert, van Dijk, and Verboven
(2010), countries that focus on inter-platform competition have performed significantly better, and access regulation
directly discourages investment.
In addition, it seems that CATV networks will not be subject to open-access obligations for their life time. The Europe
2020 Strategy expects to improve the average broadband speed for all EU citizens by 2020 about fifty times higher than the
current EU average (EC, 2010b). It thus sets up a clear target to foster the deployment and take-up of next generation access
networks. Under such a policy it can be foreseen that the current generation access networks, such as PSTN and CATV, will
be gradually and persistently migrated to fibre and disappearing in the coming years.Acknowledgements
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